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Abstract 
Organ donor rates in Australia consistently fail to meet demand. Organ donor 
registration can be made either by a blanket, cover-all question or by having the 
citizen select organs from a list. The inclusion/exclusion phenomenon has shown in 
other domains that when a person is in a situation where they are excluding items 
from a list, their resulting list is longer than if they are including items to a list 
(Kogut, 2011). We investigated whether this classic phenomenon could be exploited 
to increase organ donation rates. Using a 2 (opt-in, opt-out) x 3 (blanket, inclusion, 
exclusion) between-subjects design, we tested whether different registration 
conditions influenced (a) absolute donation (i.e., willingness to donate something), 
and (b) the number of organs donated. 141 participants (age M = 27.7 years, range: 
18 - 73, female = 108, nonbinary = 1) were randomly allocated to one of the six 
registration conditions. The exclusion approach, involving having the list pre-ticked, 
elicited more organs donated than the inclusion approach currently used in Australia. 
Individual difference measures indicated that participants’ feelings of attachment to 
organs and fear of having the body damaged after death also influenced the number 
of organs donated. The inclusion/exclusion phenomenon relies on items with a low 
evidentiary threshold being left in under exclusion and left out under inclusion. We 
suggest that feelings of attachment form this evidentiary threshold. 
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Introduction 
Improving posthumous organ donation rates is a challenge for many 
jurisdictions. Often there is high public acceptance for the concept (i.e., people 
support the idea of organ donation) but a low participation rate (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003). Across jurisdictions, systems allowing citizens to register for organ 
donation typically fall into one of two categories, reflecting the default setting. In 
one system, citizens register to be considered as a posthumous donor (opt-in). In the 
other, citizens register to exclude themselves from the donor pool (opt-out). 
Registration for posthumous organ donation under either system may be presented in 
different ways. One approach uses a blanket-type registration, including all 
transplantable organs under a single yes/no question (e.g., “Do you consent to be an 
organ donor?”). Alternatively, potential donors may be presented with a list-selection 
type of registration, where potential donors choose which options they are willing or 
unwilling to donate from a list of transplantable organs and tissue. A robust 
psychological phenomenon has been observed in relation to list selection. 
Subtractive selection (exclusion) models elicit longer final lists than additive 
(inclusion) models (Kogut, 2011). We examined whether this decision-making 
phenomenon applies to the field of organ donor registration, and whether a small 
change to the presentation of the lists can improve consent rates for organ donation. 
Although eventual donation rates are influenced by factors other than the potential 
donor’s consent/registration (e.g., family members’ preferences can override the 
individual’s registration choice as a donor), improving consent rates is a critical first 
step in increasing donation rates. 
Organ Donation 
The importance of increasing organ donation consent rates lies in the low 
conversion rate of registered donors to organ transplants. Of a total 158,504 deaths in 
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Australia in 2017, there were just 1,192 classified potential donors, and only 510 
actual donors (Organ and Tissue Authority [DonateLife], 2018).The criteria to be 
considered as a potential donor include (a) the death being in a hospital, (b) consent 
for the organ/s to be donated (from the donor and the donor’s next of kin), and (c) an 
identified opportunity to donate (e.g., an available compatible recipient; Organ and 
Tissue Authority [DonateLife], 2016). Common reasons that fewer than 50 per cent 
of potential donors became actual donors included (a) that the donor was not 
compatible with the proximate need, (b) family not consenting, and (c) medical 
exclusion (e.g., a positive virology or cancer test of the donated organ (Australia and 
New Zealand Organ Donor Registry [ANZOD], 2017; DonateLife, 2018). In 
Australia, and many other countries, the demand for organ donation is not being met 
(ANZOD, 2017; Shepherd, O’Carroll & Ferguson, 2014). Eligibility for the organ 
waiting list is dependent on the hopeful recipient’s condition and urgency (ANZOD, 
2017). The eligibility criteria are strict, and in part, driven by the scarcity of donors. 
The criteria for inclusion on the waiting list are that the recipient must have (a) 
exhausted all other treatment options, (b) no or minimal function in their organ(s), 
and (c) been assessed as likely to benefit from the transplant (DonateLife, 2016). 
Even with these strict criteria reducing the number of potential recipients, many 
individuals die on waiting lists. Further, many people are removed from the waiting 
list because of a change in their health condition while waiting for an organ – their 
health may deteriorate to a point where it is dangerous to perform the transplant 
surgery (ANZOD, 2017). With people dying or becoming too sick for a transplant 
operation, maximising the donor rate for transplantable organs is important for 
reducing the number of people on waiting lists, and the length of time for which they 
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must wait. Increasing the base of registered donors provides a larger pool of 
potential, and hopefully eventual, donors. 
As the ability to transplant organs was introduced with advances in medical 
technology, jurisdictions typically adopted the intuitive opt-in model of donor 
registration. Under opt-in systems, individuals wishing to donate must take some 
action to register as a potential donor. Under opt-out systems, individuals must take 
action to if they want to be excluded from the donor pool. Changing to an opt-out 
system has successfully increased donor registrations in some countries, but not all 
(Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). For example, Austria achieved a greater 
than five-fold increase in organ donations in the five years after changing to an opt-
out system (Rithalia, McDaid, Suekarran, Myers, & Sowden, 2009). Neighbouring 
Germany retained an opt-in system and saw relatively static donor registration rates, 
with the same advances in transplant technology (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; see 
figure 1). Other countries (e.g., Brazil, Chile and France), did not see immediate 
success from the change to the opt-out model; reportedly due to issues around 
medical mistrust (Dominguez & Rojas, 2013; Shepherd et al., 2014). The Australian 
government is resistant to changing from the opt-in system, and the Organ and 
Tissue Authority has an official position to remain with the opt-in system for the 
foreseeable future (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-04/australia-unlikely-to-
follow-opt-out-organ-donation-policy/8160718). 
While the status quo of the broader system remains in place, the registration 
system may still be finessed to help reduce the gap between available donors and 
potential recipients. Some jurisdictions, including Australia, present potential donors 
with a list of organs from which they choose which organs they are willing to 
donate. Opt-out jurisdictions may present potential donors with list from which they 
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may choose organs they are unwilling to donate. An alternative to this is the blanket 
registration option, equally applicable under opt-in and opt-out jurisdictions, where 
individuals make a single registration decision covering all transplantable organs and 
tissue without individual selection. For example, under the list registration approach, 
an individual may choose to donate their kidney, liver and pancreas but not their eye 
tissue or heart. Under the blanket registration they register as a donor for all organs 
or no organs. When an individual has a specific aversion to donating one organ, 
under the blanket registration they may choose not to become a donor. 
  
List selection systems may give citizens more choice over their registration 
options under opt-in or opt-out jurisdictions. A list registration could be presented in 
one of two ways. First, as an inclusion method (e.g., ticking boxes to select organs 
for donation). Second, as an exclusion method (e.g., unticking boxes to deselect 
organs from donation consent). We aimed to determine whether, consistent with 
inclusion/exclusion phenomena in other domains (discussed in the next section), 
these two approaches to donor registration elicit different (a) donation consent rates, 
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Figure 1. Effective organ donor consent rates in comparable opt-in and opt-out 
European countries (adapted from Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).  
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and (b) final lists, and to compare how these approaches differ from blanket 
approaches. 
The Inclusion/Exclusion Phenomenon 
Presenting respondents with a list from which they may exclude unwanted 
items results in a larger consideration list than if the same list is presented in a form 
in which respondents select items they will include (Kogut, 2011; McDonald, 
Newell, & Denson, 2014; Yaniv & Schul, 1997). For example, Yaniv and Schul 
(1997) asked participants a series of general knowledge questions such as “Who was 
the director of the film Midnight Express?” and, for each question, provided a list of 
20 possible answers. Participants in the inclusion condition selected plausible 
answers from the list, while those in the exclusion condition eliminated implausible 
answers. In the first study, the exclusion condition elicited larger consideration lists 
with, on average, 50% of the items retained as plausible correct answers compared to 
18% of the list being retained in the inclusion condition. Yaniv and Schul (1997) 
attributed the difference between conditions to a difference in the evidentiary 
threshold required to act by including or excluding each item. For the inclusion 
condition, each item had to satisfy some evidentiary basis to be included as a 
plausible correct answer. That is, the evidence must be sufficient for the participant 
to alter an item from its default status. Similarly, for the exclusion condition, each 
item had to pass an evidentiary threshold (i.e., some level of confidence that the item 
was incorrect) to be removed from the list. Thus, the difference in consideration lists 
between the two conditions can be conceived of as an average of the number of 
items for which the respondents had insufficient evidence to alter the default status 
of the item. 
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McDonald et al. (2014) asked participants to nominate, from a list of 30 
environmentally beneficial behaviours, which behaviours they were willing to adopt. 
This is not unlike a list of organs a person is willing to donate, in that the responses 
reflect attitudes rather than semantic knowledge (cf. Yaniv & Schul, 1997). Because 
it reflects attitudes (cf. semantic knowledge), one may expect a rational decision-
maker to select the same items regardless of whether the list is presented in an 
inclusion or exclusion style. Participants in the inclusion condition circled the 
behaviours they would be willing to adopt, and those in the exclusion condition 
crossed out the behaviours they would be unwilling to adopt. Despite the different 
task context, and consistent with Yaniv & Schul (1997), the exclusion condition 
elicited a larger consideration list than the inclusion condition by about 30%. 
However, closer examination of those results shows that the difference 
existed for some types of behaviour but not others, with effort and opportunity 
moderating the effect (McDonald et al., 2014). Activities perceived to have fewer 
opportunities for engagement were more likely to be selected in the inclusion 
approach, while activities which were more effortful were more likely to be selected 
(and thus excluded) in the exclusion condition. McDonald et al. (2014) proposed that 
this result could be interpreted in terms of the status quo effect, where an existing 
situation (requiring no effort to change) is more readily adopted than an alternative 
situation (requiring effortful engagement). Where the participant perceived there to 
be a lower likelihood of encountering an opportunity to engage in the pro-
environmental behaviour, the threshold for selecting it in the inclusion condition was 
more stringent than the threshold for deselecting it in the exclusion condition. When 
an activity was perceived to be more effortful, there was a greater likelihood that 
participants would cross it out in the exclusion condition, in favour of leaving some 
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behaviours on the list which were closer to their existing lifestyle (e.g., not littering, 
cf. becoming vegetarian) and thereby maintaining their own personal status quo 
(McDonald et al., 2014). In the inclusion condition, participants typically selected 
behaviours which would minimise effortful change, particularly if they perceived a 
higher probability of the situation arising. 
Kogut (2011), and Johnson and Goldstein (2003), state a simpler view that 
the decision is not made (and the status quo is preserved) either because the decision 
requires sufficient information to make the change on the page (Kogut, 2011) or it 
requires unusual effort to register or de-register as an organ donor (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003). Despite the differing proposed mechanisms for the 
inclusion/exclusion effect, the outcome remains the same: Those presented with the 
exclusion (cf. inclusion) option created greater consideration lists. 
The Status Quo Effect 
The inclusion/exclusion phenomenon and opt-in/opt-out systems have a 
theoretical relationship in that both are subject to the status quo effect wherein the 
default option is most often the outcome option (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Kogut, 
2011). The status quo effect has thus far been referred to in terms of individuals’ 
decisions around registering as an organ donor. It could be argued however, that it 
can also apply at a jurisdictional policy level.  It is easier for elected representatives 
to avoid the potential backlash of change by keeping things the way they are. The 
push to change from an opt-in to an opt-out system for organ donor registration in 
Australia has not grabbed media and public attention in the way that other social 
issues (e.g., marriage equality) have. Thus, there has been little pressure on political 
leaders to propose the change. Despite evidence for the benefits of opt-out 
approaches, and a growing understanding of the boundary conditions that might limit 
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these benefits and how these conditions might be addressed (e.g., public education 
campaigns to counter myths and medical mistrust; Shepherd et al., 2014), there 
remains no impetus for adopting an opt-out system. Thus, we focussed on achieving 
the best outcome within the current, opt-in system. Specifically, we investigated 
whether applying known psychological phenomena – relating to decision making in 
list selection – influences (a) individuals’ willingness to register as organ donors, and 
(b) the number of organs individuals are willing to donate. 
The Present Study 
We focused on whether the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon influences the 
rate of absolute donation and/or organs registered for donation, using both opt-in and 
opt-out policies, and compared to blanket registration options. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the term organ relates not only to the strict definition of an organ, but to 
all transplantable body tissue for which transplantation will benefit the recipient 
(e.g., corneas). We sought to establish whether the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon 
extends to selections in organ donation and, thus, can inform an approach to the 
registration process and improve organ donation rates.  
Proximal to our interest, Jasper and Ansted (2008) applied the 
inclusion/exclusion phenomenon when liberal or conservative students matched 
hypothetical organ transplant recipients to available organs, using either (a) an 
inclusive method of selecting which recipients should be considered, or (b) an 
exclusive method of selecting which recipients should not be considered. The 
outcome indicated that the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon applied within the 
general field of organ donation and transplantation decisions. This, together with 
previous work demonstrating the phenomenon extends beyond semantic memory 
tasks (e.g., McDonald et al., 2014), underlies our main hypotheses. A broad 
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hypothesis is that the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon would apply in the organ 
donor registration domain. Figure 2 provides examples of our inclusion/exclusion-
type lists to follow the hypotheses. For the opt-in conditions, we expected that the 
exclusion condition would elicit a greater number of organs registered for donation 
than the inclusion condition in keeping with the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon. 
Although we expected the blanket opt-in condition to preclude participants with an 
objection to donating one or more specific organs from registering as donors, it is not 
clear what proportion of respondents would fall in this category and, therefore, 
whether this effect would emerge in our data. For the opt-out conditions, we 
expected that the exclusion list would result in fewer organs registered for donation 
compared with the opt-out inclusion condition, as a selected item on the 
consideration list is a subtraction from the starting point of 15 organs. By acting on 
Inclusion  Exclusion 
Eyes   Eyes 
Heart   Heart 
Lung   Lung 
Liver   Liver 
Kidney   Kidney 
 ...    ... 
Pancreas   Pancreas 
 
Figure 2. Examples of inclusion-type list and exclusion-type list. Participants 
interact with the list by adding ticks to the inclusion list and removing ticks from 
the exclusion list. In opt-in jurisdictions, items with ticks after the respondent has 
completed the task would be registered for donation. In opt-out jurisdictions, the 
items remaining ticked after the respondent has completed the task would be 
removed from the donor register. 
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fewer list items in the pre-ticked exclusion condition, a greater number of organs 
remain selected to opt-out from the donor register. The blanket opt-out condition was 
expected to result in a similar magnitude as the inclusion condition, given the high 
acceptance of organ donation in the community (Sharpe, Moloney, Sutherland, & 
Judd, 2016) but also conditional upon the proportion of those with a specific 
objection to donating one or more organs. Finally, we expected the overall rate of 
organ donation to be high given that (a) some self-selection sampling bias was 
expected in response to the survey advertisement (i.e., favouring people predisposed 
toward organ donation), and (b) the high rates of reported acceptance of organ 
donation in the community (Newton, 2011; Sharpe et al., 2016).  
Attachment to Organs and other Individual Difference Factors 
The importance of considering individuals’ potential objections to donating 
specific organs became quickly apparent from informal conversations in preliminary 
discussions around this research. Some people strongly objected to donating their 
eyes claiming a religious belief of needing them to ‘see God’. Others strongly 
objected to donating their skin, heart, or other organs because they were perceived as 
more representative of their personage. Although anecdotal, these conversations 
align with reports of personal relevance (e.g., the perceived need to preserve bodily 
integrity to ensure progression into the afterlife) affecting individuals’ views of 
organ donation (Davison & Jhangri, 2014; Newton, 2011). To determine the extent 
to which such beliefs moderated results in our primary study, we ran a separate 
survey (independent of the main study) assessing how widespread such feelings of 
personal attachment to organs were, and to what extent they influenced individuals’ 
decisions to donate. We expected a negative correlation between participants’ ratings 
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of emotional or personal attachment to an organ and their willingness to donate that 
organ. 
Previous research has identified other factors that influence individuals’ 
decisions to register as organ donors. Thus, within the primary study, measures of 
these factors were taken to test whether (a) the factors applied in our sample, and (b) 
whether they helped to explain the results. Religious beliefs show a consistent 
negative association with participation in organ donor programs (Cantarovich et al., 
2007; Davison & Jhangri, 2014; Newton, 2011) even when the cited religion 
supports organ donation (Cantarovich et al., 2007). Issues around death have mixed 
responses. Some respondents report that organ donations give more meaning to their 
life beyond their death, while others avoid engaging with organ donor registration 
because they find death to be an uncomfortable topic (Newton, 2011). Personal 
relevance (e.g., knowing a transplant recipient), and family supportiveness of the 
issue are positively correlated registering as an organ donor, and mistrust of the 
medical profession, feeling like the body will be treated as a piece of meat, and fears 
about being unable to save the recipient correlate negatively with donor registration 
(Newton, 2011). We expected these relationships to emerge in our data. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Primary study. The primary experiment used a 2 (jurisdiction: opt-in, opt-
out) x 3 (list condition: blanket, inclusion, exclusion) between-subjects design, with 
data collected in an anonymous, online survey. Participation was open to people 
aged 18 years or over. Course credit was offered to University of Tasmania first-year 
psychology students. Recruitment of these students was undertaken via a web-based 
registration. The study was also open to the public online, and was advertised via 
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social media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), via email to friends and family, as well as 
advertisements posted around the University of Tasmania Sandy Bay campus. No 
remuneration was offered to participants recruited from the public. 
The survey was completed by 141 participants (age M = 27.7 years, range: 18 
- 73, median = 22; male = 32, female = 108, nonbinary = 1), of whom 95 were first-
year psychology students. Australia was the country of residence for 128 
participants; of the remaining 13, the United Kingdom was the most common 
country of residence, with five participants. Four participants gave a country of 
residence other than Australia but provided a Tasmanian postcode. Table 1 illustrates 
the participant breakdown by condition. 15 participants commenced the survey and 
dropped out.  
Table 1.  
Number of Participants Assigned to each 
Experimental Condition. 
 Blanket Inclusion Exclusion 
Opt-in 25 24 27 
Opt-out 20 25 20 
    
Supplementary study. The supplementary survey was completed by 151 
participants (age M = 31.3 years, range: 19 - 71, median = 28; male = 63, female = 
85, no response = 3) recruited through Prolific (www.prolific.ac). The hosting site 
was paid GBP₤0.95 (approximately AUD$2.30) per participant, of which 70% was 
passed on to the participants. Three participants dropped out during the survey, and 
five participants timed out (exceeding the maximum allotted time of 12 minutes; 
average completion time was under 4 minutes).  
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Materials 
Primary survey. Data were collected using LimeSurvey software. The 
inclusion and exclusion list conditions consisted of 15 organs which are currently 
transplantable or feasibly transplantable with advances in medical technology (see 
Appendix A). The list was intentionally made longer than the Australian list of nine 
items to ensure that if an effect was present, it was detectable. The same list was 
used in the supplementary survey on feelings of emotional attachment to organs. 
Thus, any information from the supplementary survey was directly relatable to the 
primary study. After confirming consent and eligibility to participate, respondents 
completed the organ donor registration question, with the format of this question 
(i.e., corresponding to one of the six cells of the experiment’s design) randomly 
selected by the software. Where participants were assigned to a condition with a list 
of organs, the order in which the organs were listed was also randomised by the 
software. Where the participant was assigned to a blanket condition, they did not see 
a list of organs, only a binary option. 
Prior to viewing the organ donor question, participants were advised that it 
may not be relevant to their situation, but to respond as if completing this question 
was their opportunity to register their organ donor status. The question read 
“Imagine that you are in a region which...” followed by the type of registration an 
opt-in or opt-out jurisdiction would have. This was worded in terms such as 
“requires people to register if they want to be organ donors.” The full set of 
experiment questions, along with the remaining parts of the survey are presented in 
Appendix B. 
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Knowledge of, and proximity to organ donation. We also collected 
demographic information about participants’ donor registration status; whether they 
had previously registered or considered registering as an organ donor; their 
knowledge of whether their region has opt-in or opt-out registration and which they 
would prefer; and an estimate of the proportion of the population in their region they 
believe are registered organ donors. Proximity to organ donation was measured by 
two questions – whether family or close friends have required/donated organs, and 
whether family or close friends have been posthumous donors. 
Spirituality. Religious beliefs predict people’s likelihood to register as organ 
donors or agree to a family member’s organ donation (Newton, 2011; Rodrigue, 
Cornell, & Howard, 2006; Tumin et al., 2014). The Intrinsic Spirituality Scale (ISS; 
Hodge, 2003) was developed in response to a need for a measure applicable beyond 
measuring religiosity, as many other religiosity scales were developed by believers, 
to capture their own version of belief (Hodge, 2003). The ISS has been validated in 
Christian, Cronbach’s α = .96, Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 = 14.92 (df = 9, p = .92), 
RMSEA = .062, CFI = .99 (Hodge, 2003), and United States-resident Muslim 
samples, Cronbach’s α = .93, normed χ2 = 35.43, (df = 9, p = .01), RMSEA = .070, 
CFI = .98 (Hodge, Zidan, & Husain, 2015). 
The ISS consists of six sentence-completion items, one answer option placed 
at 0 and the other answer option at 10 with a scaled continuum between, giving an 
11-point Likert scale. The first item reads “Spirituality is...” with answers ranging 
from “Not part of my life” (0) to “The master motive of my life, directing every 
other aspect of my life” (10). The wording of the remaining items in the scale 
assumed the existence of the respondent’s spirituality (e.g., “When I am faced with 
an important decision, my spirituality...”), rendering these items irrelevant to 
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participants responding zero to the initial item. Thus, if participants’ responses to the 
first item indicated that spirituality was not part of their life, we skipped the 
remaining five items on the scale. Three of the scale items (items 1, 3, and 6) were 
reverse-coded. After re-coding reverse-scored items, scores were averaged across 
questions (higher scores indicating greater self-reported spirituality). 
Fears and negative beliefs about organ donation. Some common elements 
of fear about organ donation were identified in the Newton (2011) meta-synthesis of 
organ donation research. These were fears about the organ not helping (or potentially 
harming) the recipient, fear that medical staff would be less willing to revive a 
registered donor (cf. a non-donor), and a dislike of the idea of having a mutilated 
body. Fear of death has also been found to negatively affect organ donor registration 
(Jain & Ellithorpe, 2016; Newton, 2011), as has a fear that a non-intact body could 
be rejected in the afterlife (Davison & Jhangri, 2014; Newton, 2011).  
Given that no established scale exists to measure these concepts, we 
developed a scale in which the six concepts were presented in the format of 
statements with which the participant could register some level of agreement or 
disagreement, on a five-point Likert scale response (ranging from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”). We acknowledge that, because this is not a 
validated scale, any outcomes must be interpreted with caution. None of the items 
were reverse coded. Scores were summed across items with a higher score indicating 
greater negative belief. 
Socio-cultural cognition. Political conservatism-liberalism is a factor in 
people’s decisions around organ donation (Jasper & Ansted, 2008; Newton, 2011). 
The Hierarchy/Egalitarianism – Individualism/Communality scales (HE–IC) is a bi-
axial scale developed from a grid and group model of culture typography (Douglas, 
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2007). A questionnaire was developed to measure these axes by Kahan and Braman 
(2006). The grid axis refers to a person’s preference toward a class-based hierarchy 
at one extreme and an egalitarian society at the other. The group axis measures a 
person’s preference toward an individualistic or a communitarian society (Kahan & 
Braman, 2006). 
An example of the group axis statements is “Society as a whole has become 
too soft and feminine.” An example of the grid axis statements is “The government 
should stop telling people how to live their lives.” No psychometric data could be 
found for this scale, however the Douglas-Wildavsky model has become a 
commonly used measure of social orientation (e.g. Drummond, Palmer & Sauer, 
2016; Kahan & Brahman, 2006; Verweij, et al., 2006). We included this scale to 
determine whether participants’ responses in our sample were influenced by their 
socio-political ideology. 
The second, third and fourth items on the HE scale were reverse-coded. On 
the IC scale, the second, fifth and sixth items were reverse-coded. After recoding, 
item scores on both scales were summed with higher scores indicating greater 
hierarchical/individualistic preferences.  
Trust in the health system. Trust in the health system is cited as one reason 
that a switch to the opt-out system was less successful in France and Brazil 
compared with other nations (Shepherd et al., 2014). A short-form questionnaire 
measuring individuals’ trust in the medical profession was taken from Dugan, 
Trachtenberg, and Hall (2005). That study used three short questionnaires, relating to 
a named physician, the medical profession more generally (used here) and health 
insurers, respectively. The wording of the medical profession questions was altered 
slightly for our survey (e.g., “A doctor would never mislead you about anything,” 
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was altered to “A doctor would never intentionally mislead me about anything.”) to 
match the style used in the remainder of the survey, and the word intentionally was 
inserted to clarify interpretation of what was intended to be measured. The Dugan et 
al. (2005) five-item trust in the medical profession scale has good psychometric 
properties for a short scale (Cronbach’s α = .77) with no variation across income and 
education levels. 
The first item on the medical practitioner trust scale was reverse-coded. After 
re-coding the items were summed with a higher score indicating greater trust. 
We used a seven-item questionnaire developed to measure trust in medical 
organisations and compare it with underutilization of health services (LaVeist, Isaac, 
& Williams, 2009) as a second measure of medical mistrust. A 4-point Likert scale 
measures levels of agreement with the statements provided. A minor wording change 
from “You’d better be cautious when dealing with healthcare organizations” to “You 
have to be cautious when dealing with healthcare organisations” was made to better 
fit a general vernacular without changing the meaning. Out of 17 items, the seven 
selected by the original authors loaded on a single factor with an internal validity of 
Cronbach’s α = .76 and a test-retest reliability of r = .70, p < .0001. 
There were no reverse-coded items on the scale, the scores were summed, 
with a higher score indicating greater trust. 
Social desirability response bias. We expected that a survey on this topic 
would attract some social desirability bias in responding. The SDRS-5 (Hays, 
Hayashi, & Stewart, 1989) is a 5-item scale selected for its brevity, and because it is 
aimed at assessing bias in clinical settings. The five items were the highest-loading 
of the 11-item MC Form A, which in turn is the short form version of the 33-item 
Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) of social desirability response. 
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The SDRS-5 and the Marlowe-Crowne scale differ in response type, with the latter 
being a true/false response option and the SDRS-5 uses a 5-point Likert scale 
(definitely true, mostly true, don’t know, mostly false, definitely false). The SDRS-5 
was tested on a patient sample and had fair internal reliability Cronbach’s α = .68 
and good test-retest reliability r = .75 (Hays et al., 1989) making it a suitable short 
scale. 
The first and fifth items on the scale score one point each for the lowest 
response, other responses score zero. For the remaining three items, the highest 
response attracts a one-point score for each item, other responses score zero. The 
scores were summed, with higher scores indicating greater social desirability bias. 
Social capital. The logic behind measuring participants’ social capital level  
was related to the reasoning behind the use of the cultural cognition questions. 
Davison and Jhangri (2014) reported a discrepancy in which the Canadian native 
respondents were aware of the need for organ donation, knew many organ recipients, 
and were willing to accept organs; yet they were reluctant to become donors. While 
the grid-group measure tests where people’s beliefs and wishes are, a measure of 
social capital measures reported activity which may bridge the gap of knowledge 
between thoughts and actions, further informing the results of the main experiment. 
An Australian study developed a 36-item questionnaire to measure social 
capital, covering eight orthogonal measures (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). The factors are 
(i) participation in the local community; (ii) social agency/social proactivity; (iii) 
feelings of trust and safety; (iv) neighbourhood connections; (v) family/friend 
connections; (vi) tolerance of diversity; (vii) value of life; and (viii) work 
connections. The eighth category was selectively delivered only to respondents in 
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paid employment and thus appeared to lose relevance in the context of the present 
survey. Those questions were omitted from the survey, leaving 31 items.  
A few minor wording changes were made from the original study. “Have you 
ever picked up other people’s rubbish in a public place?” was adjusted to “Have you 
recently picked up...” because it was felt that the use of the word “ever” may elicit 
higher response scoring than the participants’ current social capital mood. The 
question “If someone’s car breaks down outside your house, do you invite them into 
your home to use the phone?” seems to have become outdated with a rapid spread of 
portable landline phones and mobile phones. “If someone's car breaks down outside 
your house, do you invite them into your home to shelter from the weather?” was 
chosen as a replacement, and as offering a more compelling reason a person may or 
may not invite a stranger into the house in present times. 
 The Onyx and Bullen (2000) social capital questionnaire uses a four-point 
Likert scale with tailored responses. These were grouped as closely as possible by 
response type, for a more palatable delivery of this scale, which was the longest 
section of the survey. 
No items were reverse-coded. After re-grouping, the items were summed, 
with higher scores indicating greater social capital in each of the domains. 
Supplementary study. This survey questionnaire contained four main 
components. The first was an information sheet for the participants (see Appendix 
C2). The second was a string-input box for the participants to put their Prolific 
identification code for the purposes of matching responses with the provided 
demographic data. The third component was the first question, which asked 
participants to rate, on a six-point Likert scale, their rating of their emotional or 
personal attachment to each of the listed organs (as per Appendix A). The labels 
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were none at all, just a little, somewhat, moderately, quite strongly and extremely. 
The fourth component was the second question, which asked participants to rate, on 
a four-point Likert scale, how likely they were to donate the organ on the list. The 
labels were very unlikely, unlikely, likely and very likely. The order of organ items on 
each list was randomised, but the order of the questions was fixed. 
Procedure 
Primary study.  
Upon entering the survey, participants read an information sheet (see 
Appendix C1) which included a consent box to tick which also had the participants 
affirm that they were over 18 years of age. Participants were then presented with 
their condition of the experiment. They were advised beforehand that the question 
was hypothetical and may not be relevant to their jurisdiction, and to answer as if it 
were their registration opportunity. 
Next, basic demographic data was collected (i.e., age, gender, country of 
residence). Information on occupation, education, relationship status and number of 
children was also collected, after some jurisdictional knowledge questions. The 
survey then moved through the individual difference scales, randomising the order of 
questions within scales unless the scale information unless this was discouraged by 
the scale’s author/s. The order of questions was set out in a way that mostly 
alternated questions identifiably proximal to organ donation with those less 
obviously so (e.g., trust in the health system, cf. social desirability response). 
At the end of the survey, participants were debriefed about the study and 
thanked for their time. Links were provided to (a) a separate survey to collect the 
details of participants seeking course credit, and (b) the website of the Organ and 
Tissue Authority in Australia (www.donatelife.gov.au). 
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Supplementary study. Following ethics approval, the survey was made 
available to a pool of approximately 29,000 participants who had previously 
registered with Prolific (www.Prolific.ac) to participate in academic research in 
return for payment. 
On entering the survey, participants read an information sheet (see Appendix 
C2) and indicated their consent to participate. Next, participants were presented with 
the list of organs (see Appendix A), with the items presented in a random order. 
Participants rated the level to which they felt personally or emotionally attached to 
each organ (on a six-point Likert scale ranging from none at all to extremely, see 
Appendix D) and, on the next page, the likelihood they would consent to 
posthumously donating each organ on a four-point Likert scale (from very likely to 
very unlikely, see Appendix D). Participants were then debriefed and thanked before 
exiting the survey. 
Results 
Data Screening 
Primary survey. There were 156 respondents to the main survey. 138 
completed the survey in full. Three more of the responses were considered to have 
completed as they reached page 47 of 48 after we were advised of a survey software 
failure on some iPad branded devices and Safari browser software which rendered 
the ‘submit’ button inoperable). 
Supplementary survey. Responses were screened for validity, primarily by 
each participant’s site rating1 out of 100 (M = 99.54, range: 87 - 100, median = 100). 
                                                 
1 Prolific.ac includes information about each participant (e.g., demographics). Included in the data is a 
quality rating based upon the number of surveys they have participated in, and how many of their 
survey responses have been rejected. Higher rating indicates a lower proportion of rejected responses, 
thus indicates greater reliability. 
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Data were analysed to identify participants with invariant responses (i.e., an 
individual’s response was the same for all items). Of the 151 participants, 13 were 
invariant on the feelings of attachment scale, 65 were invariant on the willingness to 
donate scale, and 11 were invariant on both scales. Excluding those cases from 
analysis did not affect the mean ratings in a meaningful way (e.g., attachment Mfull = 
3.59; Mvariant = 3.50). The invariant data were retained for calculating mean 
differences but were excluded from analyses correlating individuals’ attachment and 
willingness to donate. 
Primary Study Results 
Participants in the blanket conditions selected simply to become a donor or 
not, while participants in the list conditions could select in a way that gave a 
continuous registration score from zero to 15. With this in mind, we first considered 
whether conditions differed in terms of absolute donation rates (i.e., a binary variable 
representing willingness to donate something). There was a strong bias toward 
donating in all conditions (see Table 2).  
Table 2. 
Absolute Donor Registrations for All Participants. 
We conducted a 2 (jurisdiction: opt-in, opt-out) x 3 (list condition: blanket, 
inclusion, exclusion) x 2 (decision: donor, non-donor) hierarchical loglinear analysis. 
  Opt-In Opt-out 
 Donors Non-Donors Donors Non-Donors 
     
Blanket 22 3 18 2 
     
Inclusion 21 3 21 4 
     
Exclusion 26 1 18 2 
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We used the loglinear model selection option in SPSS to generate a saturated model 
with backwards elimination. No valid model was generated (3-way effect: p = .721), 
indicating no significant effect of condition on willingness to donate. Partial 
likelihood ratio χ2 is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Partial Associations from the Loglinear Regression of Donation on 
Jurisdiction Type and Registration Condition. 
Next, we considered the list condition data alone in a 2 (jurisdiction: opt-in, 
opt-out) x 2 (list condition: inclusion, exclusion) ANOVA to test whether there was 
an effect of the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon on the number of organs registered 
for donation. The list condition data violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance, Levene’s W(3,92) = 4.95, p = .003 (see Figure 3). No significant difference 
between the mean registrations was found in the nonparametric measure Welch’s 
F(3,48) = 2.37, p = .082, but given that it was approaching significance, we 
investigated further. Figure 4 shows the mean registrations for each condition. A 
contrast analysis of the four list-type conditions was conducted, coded in the high 
and low hypothesized results (high [1]: opt-in, exclusion with opt-out inclusion; low 
[-1]: opt-in, inclusion with opt-out exclusion). The contrast analysis showed no 
Effect df. 
Partial 
Association 
χ2 Sig. 
Opt-In/Out*Blanket/Inclusion/Exclusion 2 0.68 .714 
Opt-In/Out*Donate 1 0.26 .608 
Blanket/Inclusion/Exclusion*Donate 2 1.58 .455 
Opt-In/Out 1 0.86 .354 
Blanket/Inclusion/Exclusion 2 0.17 .918 
Donate 1 99.90 <.001 
    
25 
 
 
 
significant difference in group means at the 0.05 alpha level in the non-parametric 
measure, t(71) = 1.91, p = .060. However, again this suggested that the hypothesized 
pattern may attain significance with greater power. 
 
We calculated effect sizes between the conditions’ registration responses (see 
Table 4). Following Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, there was one medium effect size 
and there were three small effect sizes between conditions: (i) opt-out, inclusion was 
greater than opt-in, inclusion; (ii) opt-out, inclusion was greater than opt-out, 
exclusion; (iii) opt-in, exclusion was greater than opt-in, inclusion; and (iv) opt-out, 
inclusion was greater than opt-in, exclusion. These differences are consistent with 
the hypothesised effects of the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon on participants’ 
registration choices. 
Figure 3. Distribution of list-condition registrations with density estimates. 
Condition 3 (opt-in, inclusion) has a more even distribution than the other 
conditions. Condition 4 is opt-in exclusion, condition 5 is opt-out inclusion and 
condition 6 is opt-out, exclusion. We acknowledge that the density estimates show 
values below zero and that this is not feasible. The software used to create the chart 
doesn’t facilitate creating a zero cut-off. 
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Table 4. 
Hedges’ g Effect Sizes of List Conditions on Registrations.  
  Opt-in 
Inclusion 
Opt-in 
Exclusion 
Opt-out 
Inclusion 
Opt-out 
Exclusion 
Opt-in Inclusion - 0.36^ 0.73* 0.19 
Opt-in Exclusion 
 
- 0.31^ 0.15 
Opt-out Inclusion 
  
- 0.46^ 
Opt-out Exclusion       - 
Note: * denotes medium effect size, ^ denotes small effect size 
 
Donor Registration Status. Participants were asked about their prior 
consideration of organ donation. We separated participants into those who had 
registered as organ donors (or opted-out) and those who had not registered either 
way. Having registered as an organ donor indicates that there has been some 
motivation to register, and a choice made prior to entering the experimental 
condition. With a commitment to action the difference in an experimental condition 
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Figure 4. Mean (95% CI) organs registered in the list conditions. 
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may have less influence on their responses compared with those who have not taken 
action to register. We shall refer to the participants who had previously registered as 
committed, and the non-registered as uncommitted. Fifty-five participants reported 
that they were committed, leaving 86 who were uncommitted. All committed 
participants registered as donors (or didn’t opt-out). Table 5 shows the absolute 
registration decision in the study for the 86 uncommitted participants.  
Table 5. 
Absolute Donor Status for the Uncommitted Participants.  
As with the full dataset, no valid model was generated from a 2 (jurisdiction: 
opt-in, opt-out) x 3 (list condition: blanket, inclusion, exclusion) x 2 (decision: 
donated, not donated) hierarchical loglinear analysis (3-way effect: p = .830), 
indicating that there was no significant effect of the conditions on the absolute 
decision to donate.  
For the uncommitted participants in the list conditions, we ran a 2 
(jurisdiction: opt-in, opt-out) x 2 (list condition: inclusion, exclusion) ANOVA. 
Again, the data did not meet the assumption of normal distribution, Levene’s test p = 
.011. We found no main effect of the list condition, Welch’s F(3,29) = 2.68, p = 
.066, however there was a significant interaction between jurisdiction type and list 
condition, F(1,56) = 4.71, p = .034. There was no significant difference in number of 
organs registered between the opt-out, M = 8.08, SD = 7.25 and the opt-in exclusion 
  Opt-In Opt-out 
 Donors Non-Donors Donors Non-Donors 
     
Blanket 14 3 7 2 
     
Inclusion 12 3 12 4 
     
Exclusion 16 1 10 2 
     
         
28 
 
 
 
conditions, M = 9.75, SD = 6.33. However, for the inclusion conditions, the opt-in 
condition, M = 7.00, SD = 5.55 elicited fewer organs donated than did the opt-out 
inclusion condition, M = 12.00, SD = 4.58. Among the participants in the list 
conditions who had previously registered their donor registration choice, no such 
difference was found (see Figure 5). Thus, for uncommitted participants, the strength 
of their feelings about each item on the list in the inclusion condition influenced their 
response. 
 
 
Following Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, there was one large effect size, one 
medium effect size and two small effect sizes between conditions: (i) opt-out, 
inclusion was much greater than opt-in, inclusion; (ii) opt-out, inclusion was greater 
than opt-out, exclusion; (iii) opt-in, exclusion was greater than opt-in, inclusion; and 
(iv) opt-in, exclusion was slightly greater than opt-out, exclusion (see Table 6). These 
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Figure 5. Mean (95% CI) organs registered by uncommitted participants. There was 
an interaction effect in list-condition participants who have not acted to register their 
organ donor choice. The inclusion conditions differ from each other, but the 
exclusion conditions do not, suggesting different interactions with the lists. 
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effect sizes further support the interaction effect – that the inclusion-type lists had a 
greater influence between opt-in and opt-out conditions.  
Table 6. 
Hedges’ g Effect Sizes of List Conditions on Registration for 
Uncommitted Participants. 
  
Opt-in 
Inclusion 
n = 15 
Opt-in 
Exclusion 
n = 16 
Opt-out 
Inclusion 
n = 17 
Opt-out 
Exclusion 
n = 12 
Opt-in Inclusion - .46^ .99** .17 
Opt-in Exclusion 
 
- .41^ .25^ 
Opt-out Inclusion 
  
- .67* 
Opt-out Exclusion 
   
- 
Notes: ** denotes large; * denotes medium; ^ denotes small effect sizes. 
 
Individual Difference Factors. Individuals’ negative beliefs about donating 
organs were associated with their registration choices. The questions used in the 
survey were not from a previously developed and validated scale. The sample sizes 
in this study are not likely to be large enough to constitute a stable factor analysis 
(MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999), nor are the questions oblique. 
However, the relationships between the questions and their results were analysed to 
determine the validity of tests using a total score. Sampling adequacy was in the 
middling range of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO = .702; Kaiser, 1974), and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 156.7, p < .001). Appendix D has the full correlation 
matrix for these six questions. There were only two non-significant intercorrelations: 
(i) fear that the donated organ would not help the recipient and don’t like the idea of 
my body being damaged after death (Pearson’s r  = .114, p = .090); and (ii) fear that 
the donated organ may harm the recipient and don’t like the idea of my body being 
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damaged after death, r = .112, p = .092. No intercorrelations were excessively high, 
the largest being fear that the donated organ would not help the recipient and fear 
that the donated organ may harm the recipient, r = .563, p < .001. These two factors 
with the highest intercorrelations explained 61 per cent of the total variance, with the 
lowest component explaining 7 per cent of the variance. Overall, it appeared that the 
data was, in general, all measuring the types of fears which Newton (2011) identified 
and were sufficient also to measure as a total score. 
A binary logistic regression was performed to determine the effects of 
participants’ negative beliefs on their choice to register as a donor or not. The model 
predicted decision to register, χ2(6) = 33.14, p < .001, explaining 42.6% (Nagelkerke 
R2) of the variation in choice to donate, and correctly classifying 90.1% of cases. 
Sensitivity was high (97.6%) but specificity was low (26.7%) indicating that there 
was a bias in the test scores against identifying those who do not hold these fears. 
The positive predictive value of donor status given negative belief ratings was 
91.8%, and the predictive value of a non-donor status was 57.1%. Of the six fear 
questions, two were statistically significant: A 1.05-point increase in the negative 
belief that donor status would the likelihood that their life would be saved had a 2.23 
times greater likelihood to result in a non-donor status (B = -.80, SE = 0.289, p = 
.003); and a 1.3-point increase in concern about having their body damaged after 
death increased the chance of a non-donor status by 2.6 times (B = -.958, SE = .325, 
p = .013). 
We ran a hierarchical linear regression of the list conditions’ registration 
scores on the six types of negative belief. This indicated that, for all four of the list 
conditions, the model with three factors: (i) aversion to having their body damaged 
after death, M = 2.18, SD = 1.37, (ii) fear that they are less likely to have their life 
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saved, M = 1.77, SD = 1.04, and (iii) fear that the organ would not help the recipient, 
M = 2.64, SD = 1.18, explained between 26.5% and 53.6% of the variation in 
response, dependent on the condition (see Table 7).  
The other individual difference measures offered little-or-no systematic 
predictive value of donor registration, and the few statistically significant findings 
were treated as potential Type I errors. For example, the social agency subgroup of 
the social capital measure explained 20% of the variance in the opt-in, inclusion 
condition (p = .016) but had no predictive value in the other conditions. Thus, for 
brevity and to avoid unwarranted speculation, we do not report the analyses of other 
individual difference variables here.  
There was no evidence of systematic social desirability biased responding, M 
= 0.85, SD = 1.05. Two respondents scored the maximum score of 5 points, seven 
more scored 3 or 4 points. 68 respondents scored zero. 
 
Table 7.  
 
Optimal Models from the Hierarchical Regression of Donor Response on Negative 
Beliefs. The Model Selected the Same Three Negative Belief Items in each Condition. 
  
Adj 
R2 F 
df 
(F) p (F) ΔR2 ΔF p (model) 
Opt-in, inclusion .465 7.65 3, 20 .001 .358 15.38 .001 
Opt-in, exclusion .265 3.88 3, 21 .024 .272 8.88 .007 
Opt-out, inclusion .500 9.68 3, 23 < .001 .386 20.09 < .001 
Opt-out, exclusion .536 8.32 3, 16 .001 .504 20.63 < .001 
 
We asked participants’ opinions on whether their jurisdiction should be opt-
in or opt-out. 53 per cent of respondents selected a preference for an opt-in system, 
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44 per cent preferred an opt-out system, and the remaining four respondents were 
unsure. 
Supplementary Study Results 
Participants’ feelings of attachment and likelihood of donating organs are 
presented in Figure 6. There was a strong negative correlation between the rating of 
attachment to each item and the likelihood of donating it, Pearson’s r = -.906, p < 
.001, R2 = .801. There was a strong positive correlation between the likelihood of 
donating in the supplementary study and registration to donate organs in the primary 
study’s list conditions, Pearson’s r = .916, p < .001, R2 = .838. Figure 7 shows the 
relationship between ratings of attachment and willingness to donate in the 
supplementary study and likelihood of registering to donate organs in the primary 
study.
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Figure 6. Participants’ ratings (95% CI) of feeling of attachment (scale of 6) and 
likelihood to donate (scale of 4) for each of the organs. 
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Discussion 
We investigated whether the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon would appear 
in the field of organ donor registration, and whether the presentation method would 
affect potential donors’ absolute choice to be a donor, or the number of organs they 
registered for donation. If presentation method affects donor registration behaviour, 
the findings could inform us of ways to improve organ donation rates within the 
existing system and inform future policy. We hypothesised that, consistent with prior 
research across a variety of domains (e.g. Kogut, 2011; McDonald et al., 2014; 
Yaniv & Schul, 1997), exclusion conditions would elicit longer final lists than 
inclusion conditions. For an opt-in jurisdiction, a longer list would mean a greater 
number of organs donated; and for an opt-out jurisdiction this would mean fewer 
organs donated.  
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Although the results failed to achieve statistical significance at the p < .05 
level, the effect sizes did show that, among the opt-in conditions, the exclusion 
condition returned a greater number of organs registered for donation than the 
inclusion condition. Among the opt-out conditions, the inclusion condition retained a 
greater number of registered organs through having fewer opt-outs than the exclusion 
condition. In the opt-in, inclusion condition, participants appear to have interacted 
more with the items on the list compared with the other list conditions (see figure 3). 
The opt-in, inclusion condition had the fewest 15-item donors – to do so would have 
involved ticking every box. In the opt-out, inclusion condition, participants mostly 
selected to remain being a donor, and this condition had the fewest non-donors – to 
do so would have involved ticking every box.  
When we looked at only the uncommitted participants (i.e., not having prior 
organ donor registration), the effect of the conditions was magnified, and an 
interaction effect appeared. By looking only at the uncommitted participants, we 
were looking at the target market for new organ donors and excluding those who are 
less likely to be influenced by their previous decision. For the uncommitted 
participants, the number of organs donated under the inclusion conditions differed 
between the opt-in and opt-out conditions, as we had hypothesised. However, under 
the exclusion conditions, there was no such difference. This indicates that, in the 
decision-making process, the effect of having the boxes all pre-ticked encouraged 
more people to leave them ticked. Where the boxes were un-ticked, participants were 
less likely to tick all the boxes. 
This interaction finding follows the theory behind the inclusion/exclusion 
phenomenon, that there is an evidentiary threshold eliciting differences between 
inclusion and exclusion conditions. Typically, the evidentiary threshold provides 
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what Yaniv and Schul (1997) termed a burden of proof, the strength of which causes 
different interactions with the list items. Yaniv, Schul, Raphaelli-Hirsch and Maoz 
(2002) suggested that the evidentiary threshold in their inclusion/exclusion study 
was a level of knowledgeability about the parliamentary elections. McDonald et al, 
(2014) suggested that the evidentiary threshold was the likelihood that adopting the 
pro-environmental behaviour would disrupt the respondent’s routines. In our study, 
fewer participants passed the evidentiary threshold to tick every item, compared with 
the conditions where an evidentiary threshold had to be passed to untick the items, 
causing an interaction effect. This left us to consider what the basis of the 
evidentiary threshold may be, so we considered two of the other main findings: (a) 
attachment to organs, and (b) negative beliefs about organ donation. 
We found a strong negative relationship between feelings of attachment to 
organs and the likelihood to donate. We will discuss how such feelings may provide 
the evidentiary threshold for the inclusion/exclusion phenomenon in the context of 
organ donor registration. McDonald et al. (2014), when measuring the effect of the 
inclusion/exclusion phenomenon in the context of adopting environmentally friendly 
behaviours, proposed that the thresholds for deciding which behaviours to adopt was 
oriented around the behaviours which maintained the greatest status quo in the 
respondent’s pattern of behaviour. For example, where there was a smaller 
probability that the behaviour would be required (i.e., it is less likely to disrupt their 
routine), it was more likely to be chosen. When the prospective organ donor has a 
strong attachment to an organ, this may motivate their desire to keep the status quo 
and not donate the organ. Thus, feelings of attachment may be the basis upon which 
a person may decide to select an organ for donation in an inclusion situation, or to 
deselect it from the list, dependent on whether they are presented with an inclusion 
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or exclusion condition. Where the strength is moderate to low, the item may be 
skipped over in the inclusion condition, but also not deselected in the exclusion 
condition. This explanation fits within the primary concept that the difference 
between the inclusion and exclusion consideration lists is due to some individual 
difference factor within which a threshold must be met for selection or deselection 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). A very strong feeling of attachment may influence 
an individual’s decision not to register as an organ donor under any condition. 
We included blanket opt-in and opt-out conditions (consistent with current 
practice in many jurisdictions) in which no list is presented. We believed that an 
individual who had an objection to donation may choose not to be registered as a 
donor in either blanket condition. In the absence of a list they were unable to exclude 
the organ/s with the objection from registration, hence they would exclude all 
organs. We were uncertain of the proportion of respondents who would have an 
objection to donating an organ, and who would decline to donate (in a blanket 
condition) based on that objection.  
The proportion of participants having an objection to donating one or more 
organs was high. In fact, in the supplementary survey 80 of the 151 participants 
(53%) rated some item on the list as unlikely or very unlikely to donate. When we 
considered only the nine organs on the Australian registration form, this proportion 
decreased to 72 of the 151 participants (48%). While the conditions of the 
supplementary study may have influenced this statistic by priming the respondents 
with the feelings of attachment question, it does indicate that the prevalence of an 
objection to donating some organs may be high. The results of the main study, in 
which the conditions did not have that possible prime effect, support this notion. For 
example, in the opt-in, inclusion condition, of the 22 participants who registered to 
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donate at least one organ in that condition, just 11 agreed to donate all nine of the 
organs on the Australian registration form (Appendix A indicates these nine organs). 
These numbers indicate a similar prevalence of an objection to donating one or more 
organs, however the objections did not show up in the blanket conditions, with both 
conditions having a high donor registration rate. The objections did show up in the 
primary study’s four list-type conditions. 
One explanation for the high blanket-condition donation rate in the presence 
of such objections is that the use of a list primes the respondent to recall their 
objection, where the blanket question does not. Thus, when presented with the 
simple option to become a donor, it may be that, without the list present, the decision 
does not involve a consideration of the individual organs included in the decision. 
When an inclusion-style list condition is offered, the respondent is primed to decide 
on each item individually, increasing the salience of objections related to individual 
organs. It follows that the exclusion-style of presenting the opt-in list elicits a 
response in between that of the opt-in blanket condition and the opt-in inclusion list. 
While there may be some element of a priming effect as they cast their eyes briefly 
over the pre-ticked list, the interaction with each item may be reduced for the 
motivated donor. This would less often raise the salience of any objection. We must 
also consider the possibility that the high registration rate in the blanket conditions 
was simply due to a response bias in our sampling. If we were to assume that we had 
attracted a sample biased toward becoming organ donors, this could reduce the effect 
of objections. This weakening of the effect of objections could be exacerbated by the 
lack of salience in the no-list blanket conditions. 
Prior research (e.g., Newton, 2011, Sharpe et al., 2016) found that fears and 
negative beliefs have a reducing effect on organ donor registrations. We measured 
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six negative beliefs and found three to be statistically associated with the differences 
in registration responses in all four list conditions, although each received low 
average scores from participants. The concern of having the body damaged after 
death is one which conceivably could associate with an evidentiary threshold of 
attachment to organs, and the concept of maintaining the status quo. The fear that 
medical personnel would be more willing to let a donor die is conceptually more 
closely associated with avoidance of donor registration. The fear that the donated 
organ would not help the recipient feels somewhat irrational in the absence of an 
effect of spirituality. The latter two negative beliefs do not conceptually link well 
with variability of response in the list conditions, and it may be that the questions 
primed the salience of the fears among the same participants for whom seeing organs 
listed in the registration conditions influenced their response. 
We could not look at a chart of these results and expect these to be reflective 
of the ecological organ donor rates measurable between jurisdictions, nor is that 
what we intended to demonstrate. Unlike ecological registrations, our participants 
were placed in the registration conditions (albeit having sought out the survey) rather 
than seeking to register to donate/opt-out. Our outcomes are intended to represent 
citizens’ behaviour at registration rather than population-level registrations. To 
illustrate, we could return to the example of opt-in jurisdiction Germany and opt-out 
jurisdiction Austria. If, hypothetically, Germany used an inclusion registration, and 
Austria used an exclusion registration, we could not expect that those countries’ 
citizens have an average of 9.54 organs and 10.65 organs registered respectively. In 
Austria, the opt-out registrations are subtracted from the approximate 99% of the 
population who are automatically registered as full donors. This would mean that the 
approximate 1% of the population who registered to opt-out may still have 10.65 
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organs registered, were this condition and these findings to apply. Conversely in 
Germany, it would be the registered 12% of the population who have 9.54 organs 
registered on average, leaving the remainder of the population as non-donors. This 
does not diminish any findings of this study, but this example highlights the 
difference between studying registration decisions and jurisdictional outcomes. We 
also are not accounting for jurisdictional rules around seeking family consent 
regardless of registration choices, with such rules commonplace in both opt-in and 
opt-out jurisdictions. 
Limitations 
A design limitation it that our study placed respondents in the situation of 
registering under conditions they may not have ordinarily sought. For 95 of our 
participants, there was possibly little motivation beyond course participation credit. 
Ordinarily, the person registering will have a higher level of motivation. In opt-out 
jurisdictions, the motivation is based on an objection to donating, either of a specific 
organ, or more generally. The motivation in an opt-in jurisdiction is more likely to 
have an element of altruism, or perhaps, social desirability. When it comes to the 
registration decision, these factors will play into the choices people make when they 
do register. This may have exaggerated the effect of our manipulation, if registering 
citizens have a strong motivation to donate. However, if a public campaign was run 
in a way which captured less motivated citizens (e.g., seeking registrations at 
doctors’ surgery visits), offering an exclusion-type list may prove to elicit more 
organs donated than an inclusion-type list. 
Another limitation of this study to ecological validity is that our opt-in, 
inclusion condition did not include the donate all option found on the Australian 
registration form. The presence of this option may allow the respondent to 
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effectively bypass the list in a similar way that a donation-motivated responder to 
our exclusion condition would. However, it could be argued that the presence of an 
un-ticked list may still increase the salience of feelings of attachment and objections 
to donating. 
The method of exclusion we used was different from some other studies. For 
example, McDonald et al. (2014) provided their lists of environmentally beneficial 
behaviours on paper. The inclusion condition had participants tick items to include, 
the exclusion condition had participants put a line through items to exclude them. In 
contrast, providing a pre-ticked list (allowing participants to deselect items if they 
wished), changed the way the participants interacted with the list. In hindsight, our 
method did not force participants to interact with each item on the list in the same 
way as prior inclusion/exclusion research. Perhaps more of our opt-in, exclusion 
participants left the boxes ticked without considering the organs, more closely 
operating as a blanket condition. This would exaggerate the response found in that 
condition, especially for our uncommitted participants. What our conditions did do, 
however, was model an approach which could be easily adopted into the Australian 
online registration system with a simple change to offering pre-ticked boxes. 
Opportunities for Further Research 
Future research in this area could introduce an exclusion method which 
forces participants to more actively engage with each item on the list, to determine 
whether this elicits a different result, and whether it shows any effect of the 
individual difference factors. More generally, it offers the opportunity to measure the 
ways in which people interact with a list if it is pre-selected, compared with lists 
which are not, and compared to the previously-used opt-out approaches. This may be 
informative for decision theory with increasing online services and decision-making 
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undertaken using electronic devices. More advanced presentations of electronic 
registration could also be investigated, such as having a list appear on demand for 
those who wish to selectively register, but having the list hidden for those who wish 
to blanket donate. This could further measure whether such approaches reduce the 
salience of objections and feelings of attachment. 
A further research opportunity also exists in investigating attachment to 
organs and whether there is some association with negative beliefs, such as 
posthumous mutilation. Our method collected the data on these from separate 
samples, so were unable to make such analysis. It could be suggested that fear of 
having posthumous mutilation and attachment both relate to having an objection to 
donating an organ. Research in this area could inform future education campaigns 
and inform donor registration drives. 
Conclusion 
We investigated the differences in list presentation formats, and opt-in versus 
opt-out systems, on organ donor consent rates. Based on our findings, the condition 
which most closely replicates the current Australian registration form elicits the 
fewest number of organs donated. This was, however, without that form’s option to 
donate all organs, which is likely to improve consent rates. 
In practical terms, this finding has implications for electronic registration 
forms, such as those in use in Australia, in the absence of a desire to move toward an 
opt-out model. We suggest that inclusion lists increase the salience of objections to 
donation, where a simple change to offering pre-ticked boxes may make the process 
more comfortable for those with lower-level feelings of attachment to organs and 
thereby may meet shortfalls in the availability of organs for which feelings of 
attachment are more prevalent.  
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Appendix A 
The list of fifteen organs and tissue used in this study.  
An asterisk (*) denotes the nine organs/tissue which appear on the Australian donor 
registration form. 
• Lungs * 
• Eyes (Eye tissue *) 
• Heart * 
• Bone Marrow 
• Limbs/Fingers/Toes 
• Kidney * 
• Nose/Ear/Mouth Tissue 
• Brain (or part) 
• Liver * 
• Reproductive Organs 
• Heart Valves * 
• Stem Cells 
• Pancreas * 
• Skin Tissue * 
• Bone Tissue * 
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Appendix B 
The survey questions in the primary survey. 
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Appendix C1 
The information and consent sheet from the primary survey. 
1. Invitation 
You are invited to participate in the confidential online Posthumous Organ 
Donor Registration Survey. 
The study is being conducted by Dr. James Sauer (Senior Lecturer, Division 
of Psychology, School of Medicine, UTAS) and Mr Paul Schokman (Honours 
Student, Division of Psychology, School of Medicine, UTAS). This study is 
being conducted in partial fulfilment of an Honours degree for Mr Schokman 
under the supervision of Dr Sauer. 
 
2. What is the purpose of the survey? 
The survey is being conducted as a research project within the University of 
Tasmania Health Sciences (Psychology) as an honours project. The aim is to 
investigate factors which may improve the rates of posthumous organ 
donation - the organ donations people can make after their death. 
 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
Participation is open to anyone over the age of 18. Your participation is 
voluntary, and there are no consequences should you decide not to 
participate. 
 
4. What will I be asked to do? 
The survey will take an average person about 20 minutes to complete 
(including reading this page) and will involve answering questions in relation 
to your choices in registering for posthumous organ donor registration, your 
beliefs and attitudes in related aspects such as religiosity, social views and 
social outlook, prior exposure to organ donation issues and some 
demographic information. This information is being collected because 
previous research has found strong connections between these issues and 
organ donation. 
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the questions in this survey, other 
than the most true answer for you. Where there are multiple selections 
available you are free to select as many or as few as you like. References to 
organ donation are intended to mean the donating of organs and tissue after 
a person's death, to a recipient who requires that organ/tissue to improve 
their health. 
Your responses will be anonymous. Informed consent is implied by 
completion and submission of the survey.  
 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Participation in the survey provides you the opportunity to contribute to the 
knowledge about why people choose to be organ donors. 
First year psychology students at the University of Tasmania are offered 
course participation credit for completion. All participants will be rewarded 
with the knowledge that they have made a valuable contribution to an 
important field of study. 
 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with the survey. However, be 
aware that, because it is a survey about posthumous organ donation, there 
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are themes relating to death and serious illness. If such questions raise 
issues for you, then you are free to withdraw from the survey at any time. 
If you experience any distress as a result of participation please feel free to 
contact the research supervisor, Dr Sauer. Alternatively, should you wish to 
access counselling or support services, in Australia you can contact Lifeline 
on 131 114 or, if you are a student or staff member at the University of 
Tasmania, the University of Tasmania counselling service on (03) 6226 2697 
or (03) 6324 3787. 
 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you complete some survey questions but choose to not submit the survey, 
your responses will not be recorded. As this survey does not allow for the 
identification of participants, once a completed survey is submitted results 
are unable to be withdrawn. 
 
8. What will happen to the survey information? 
Data will be treated as confidential and will only be used for the study and 
any follow-up studies within the same research field. Information collected 
will be kept in a secure location at the University of Tasmania and access will 
be at the discretion of the researchers. 
 
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
Results will be published in a bound thesis held within the faculty and as a 
poster presentation within the psychology faculty. Results may also be 
published in academic peer reviewed journals or as the subject of posters or 
presentations at conferences. Interested participants can contact the 
researchers by the email addresses below to find out more about the results 
of the study. 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the researcher by 
email: pauls12@utas.edu.au or the Research Supervisor: 
jim.sauer@utas.edu.au 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the 
conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email 
human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person nominated 
to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics 
reference number [insert here]. 
 
We appreciate and look forward to your participation in this survey. 
 
 I have read and understood the information provided about this 
study, I confirm I am over 18 years old, and I consent to 
participating. 
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Appendix C2 
The information and consent sheet from the supplementary survey. 
1. Invitation 
You are invited to participate in this confidential online Emotional Attachment to the Body survey. 
The study is being conducted by Dr. James Sauer (Senior Lecturer, Division of Psychology, School of 
Medicine, UTAS) and Mr Paul Schokman (Honours Student, Division of Psychology, School of 
Medicine, UTAS). This study is being conducted in partial fulfilment of an Honours degree for Mr 
Schokman under the supervision of Dr Sauer. 
2. What is the purpose of the survey? 
The survey is being conducted as a research project within the University of Tasmania Health 
Sciences (Psychology) as an honours project. The aim is to investigate factors which affect people's 
organ donation choices. It is a supplementary survey to a larger project on organ donor registration 
behaviour. 
 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
Participation has been sought through Prolific Academic, with which you are involved. 
 
4. What will I be asked to do? 
The survey will take an average person about 10 minutes to complete (including reading this page), 
and will involve answering questions in relation to your feelings of personal or emotional attachment to 
different body parts which may be listed as organs which can be donated now or potentially in the 
future. 
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the questions in this survey, other than the most true answer 
for you. References to organ donation are intended to mean the donating of organs and tissue after a 
person's death, to a recipient who requires that organ/tissue to improve their health. 
Your responses will be anonymous. Informed consent is implied by completion and submission of the 
survey.  
 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Participation in the survey provides you the opportunity to contribute to the knowledge about why 
people choose to be organ donors. 
As a Prolific Academic participant, you are being paid for your time to complete this survey at the 
suggested market rate. 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with the survey. However, be aware that, because it is a 
survey about posthumous organ donation, it may raise thoughts about death and serious illness. If 
such thoughts may cause issues for you, then you are free to withdraw from the survey before 
completion. 
If you experience any distress as a result of participation please feel free to contact the research 
supervisor, Dr Sauer. Alternatively, should you wish to access counselling or support services, in 
Australia you can contact Lifeline on 131 114 or. if you are a student or staff member at the University 
of Tasmania, the University of Tasmania counselling service on (03) 6226 2697 or (03) 6324 3787. 
Similar services exist in other countries to assist you, such as Mental Health America (1-800-273-
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TALK) and in the UK Samaritans on 116 123. 
 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you complete some survey questions but choose to not submit the survey, your responses will not be 
recorded. As this survey does not allow for the identification of participants, once a completed survey is 
submitted results are unable to be withdrawn. 
 
8. What will happen to the survey information? 
Data will be treated as confidential and will only be used for the study and any follow-up studies within 
the same research field. Information collected will be kept in a secure location at the University of 
Tasmania and access will be at the discretion of the researchers. 
 
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
Results will be published in a bound thesis held within the faculty and as a poster presentation within 
the psychology faculty. Results may also be published in academic peer reviewed journals or as the 
subject of posters or presentations at conferences. Interested participants can contact the researchers 
by the email addresses below to find out more about the results of the study. 
 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions about the study please contact the researcher by email: 
pauls12@utas.edu.au or the Research Supervisor: jim.sauer@utas.edu.au 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. 
If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive 
Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The 
Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please 
quote ethics reference number [insert here]. 
 
We appreciate and look forward to your participation in this survey. 
 I have read and understood the information provided about this study, I confirm I am over 18 
years old, and I consent to participating. 
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Appendix D 
The supplementary survey questions. 
Participant demographic data was provided separately by Prolific (www.prolific.ac). 
 
